Islamization by Secular Ruling Parties: The Case of Bangladesh by Lorch, Jasmin
www.ssoar.info
Islamization by Secular Ruling Parties: The Case of
Bangladesh
Lorch, Jasmin
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Lorch, J. (2019). Islamization by Secular Ruling Parties: The Case of Bangladesh. Politics and Religion, 12(2),
257-282. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048318000573
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-62423-8
Islamization by Secular Ruling
Parties: The Case of Bangladesh
Jasmin Lorch
GIGA Institute of Middle East Studies (IMES), GIGA German
Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract: As of yet, Islamization by secular ruling parties has hardly been
investigated in depth. To bridge this gap, the present article reviews the
existing literature on Islamization, synthesizes the scattered existing theoretical
insights on Islamization by secular actors and applies them to the case of
Bangladesh. It argues that, especially when they act in conjunction, three main
conditions can drive secular rulers to Islamize public policy: first, the rise of
Islamist social movements; second, fierce political competition; and third,
(semi-)authoritarian rule. Focusing on the current Awami League (AL)
government, the article shows how these three factors have interacted to
produce a top-down process of state-led Islamization in Bangladesh.
In December 1971, Bangladesh was established as a secular state based on
the country’s ethno-linguistic Bengali identity (e.g. Siddiqi 2011, 18), fol-
lowing a war of independence against Pakistan in which between one and
three million Bangladeshis were killed (Cordon 2007, 14). The Awami
League (AL) that led the independence struggle is a secular party,
whose constitution pledges “[t]o build a [s]ecular, democratic society
and state-system imbued with the spirit of Liberation War” (AL constitu-
tion). In the 2008 elections, which it won decisively, the AL appealed to
secular voters (Jahan and Shahan 2014, 432).
Eight years into the AL’s continued rule, however, the situation looks
different. In February 2016, law enforcement arrested the editor of
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Islam Bitorko (Debate on Islam), a book that includes a provocative chapter
on Muslims and sex, on grounds that it hurt religious sentiments and closed
his stalls at the annual Ekushey Book Fair in Dhaka (Express Tribune 16
February 2016). One year later, the Bangla Academy, the national academy
for the promotion of the Bengali language and the convener of the fair,
announced that it would alert the security forces to any “blasphemous”
books advertised at the event (Dhruba 2017). In January 2017, the govern-
ment launched new editions of schoolbooks, which featured more refer-
ences to religious symbols and from which 17 poems that Islamic
conservatives had despised as “atheist” had been removed (Barry and
Manik 2017). Moreover, the AL government has massively enhanced its
support of mosques and madrassahs (Islamic education institutions).1
Thereby, the AL is replicating the policy of its arch-rival, the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP). When it was in power from 2001 to 2006, the
BNP introduced various measures that benefitted Islamist parties and con-
servative madrassahs (ICG 2006, 5, 19ff.; Riaz 2007a, 39ff.). In its cam-
paign for the 2008 elections, which it lost, the BNP used the slogan
“save Islam and the country” (Daily Star 23 December 2008).
Why do secular ruling parties Islamize? Using the example of
Bangladesh, this article shows that, especially when they act in conjunc-
tion, three main conditions can drive secular rulers to Islamize public
policy: first, the rise of Islamist social movements; second, fierce political
competition; and third, (semi-)authoritarian rule. It enriches the debate on
Islamization in Bangladesh, which remains severely understudied (for
exceptions, see Riaz 2007a; 2007b; 2014; Riaz and Fair 2011; Kabir
2015; Fair, Hamza, and Heller 2017). This research lacuna is highly prob-
lematic, not least in view of the increase in terrorist attacks that the country
has recently experienced, most notably the July 2016 attack on the Holey
Artisan Bakery café in Dhaka that was claimed by the Islamic State (Fair,
Hamza, and Heller 2017, esp. 622–624; Kugelman and Ahmad 2017).
In addition, analyzing the Islamization efforts of secular ruling parties
in Bangladesh contributes to the broader theoretical debate on
Islamization. Specifically, works that tackle the Islamization of public
policy usually concentrate on Islamization by Islamist actors (Buehler
2013, 63), such as the establishment of an Islamic state by the Islamic rev-
olutionary movement in Iran (e.g. Martin 2007), or the Islamization efforts
undertaken by Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab Spring
(e.g. Donker 2013; Ghanem 2013). Moreover, the few isolated works that
deal with Islamization by secular politicians often limit themselves to
studying countries such as Egypt, Malaysia or Algeria, where secular
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incumbents have faced Islamist contenders with strong support at the
ballot boxes (e.g. Ismail 2006; Kubicek 2015, 83–116). Contrary to
this, the Bangladeshi case provides insights into the motivations that
may drive secular ruling parties to Islamize in the absence of strong
Islamist opposition parties.2
Furthermore, it contributes to the broader theoretical debate on the
extent to which ideational factors and religious ideas (Gill 2008, 7–9,
31–32, 57–59), the competition between secular and religious actors in
society (Fox 2015, esp. 32–35), or political elite interests (Fox 2015,
esp. 36–38; 132, 239–246; Gill 2008, 7–9, 31, 32, 57–59) drive religion
policy-making. Based on extensive quantitative data, Fox (2015) has
recently argued that states are becoming more entangled with religion
and that this also includes states that officially endorse secularism.
Many of the increasing forms of entanglement he identifies can be
observed particularly in Muslim-majority countries (Fox 2015, 98–104,
118, 133–134, 214–216). Fox traces these trends to an ongoing competi-
tion between secular and religious actors in society in which the latter cur-
rently have “the upper hand” (Fox 2015, 65). However, the exact
motivations of (secular) state leaders to get involved in religion cannot
be clearly determined by quantitative studies (Fox 2015, 104), and Fox
himself admits that the practical interests of political elites sometimes
play an important role in religion policy-making (Fox 2015, 239–246).
Against this backdrop, an in-depth study of Bangladesh that carves out
the motivations of secular ruling parties to engage in Islamization is the-
oretically relevant, as the country presents an interesting puzzle with
regard to the relationship between the social role of Islamist forces and
religion policy-making. Specifically, Bangladesh has often been hailed
as a textbook example of the reconcilability of Islam and secular democ-
racy (Fair, Hamza, and Heller 2017, 622), and, since 2001, the vote share
of Islamist parties has never been above 6.3% (Riaz 2014, 163–165), indi-
cating that the social impact of Islamist forces is low. Nevertheless, con-
secutive secular-party governments have apparently felt compelled to
accommodate diverse Islamist forces, raising the question of why this
has been the case.
The article synthesizes and expands the scattered theoretical insights on
the conditions driving secular parties to support Islamization that exist in
the literature. Specifically, while existing case studies have discussed the
role of Islamist movements, political competition, and (semi-)authoritarian
rule in spurring Islamization by secular rulers, they have neither gauged
the relative explanatory potential of these factors nor linked them in any
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systematic way. To bridge these gaps, this article first connects these three
factors to Fox’s (2015) and Gill’s (2008) theoretical considerations on the
drivers of religion policy-making and then tests and refines the resulting
explanations of Islamization by secular rulers with rich qualitative data
from Bangladesh. The empirical findings presented build on 51 interviews
conducted from January to March 2017 with representatives of the AL and
the BNP, Islamist forces, civil society actors, as well as Bangladeshi and
international experts.
ISLAMIZATION BY SECULAR RULERS: EXISTING
THEORETICAL INSIGHTS
Drawing on Ismail (2006, esp. 1–4, 22–26), this article defines
Islamization as a process whereby political practices and public policy
are increasingly (re-)ordered according to Islamic rules and symbols. As
such, Islamization can occur in different policy domains and can be
driven by both Islamist and secular actors.3 Islamist actors, on the other
hand, are defined more narrowly as political actors who (permanently)
place their own ideals, aims, and demands into an Islamic frame of refer-
ence (Asseburg 2007, 9). Secular political actors are defined as actors
who ideologically advocate the avoidance of state involvement in religion
(Fox 2015, 8, 28; Moshin 2004, cited in Kabir 2015, 60).
Case studies on various Muslim-majority countries, including Indonesia
(e.g. Freedman 2009; Buehler 2013), Malaysia (e.g. Abott and Gregorios-
Pippas 2010; Camroux 1996; Liow 2004), Pakistan (e.g. Malik 1986;
Khan 2013; Butt 2016), Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt (e.g. Parmentier
1999; Ismail 2006; Hamid 2014), show that secular ruling parties some-
times engage in Islamization. The resulting state-led Islamization efforts
can include the introduction of blasphemy laws, an Islamization of the
state-run education system through textbook and curriculum changes, or
increased state support for madrassahs (Malik 1986, 598–599; Camroux
1996, 856–863; Parmentier 1999; Liow 2004, 194–97; Khan 2013, 147).
Islamic Revivalism and Islamist Social Movements
According to the “competition-perspective” proposed by Fox (2015,
esp. 32–35), state religion policy is predominantly the result of struggles
between secular and religious actors in society. Similarly, several case
studies on Muslim-majority countries point to the role that “bottom-up
260 Lorch
pressures” (Abbott and Gregorios-Pippas 2010, 148), such as the revival
of Islamic orthodoxy or Islamist social movements, can play in driving
secular rulers to promote Islamization (e.g. Ismail 2006; Abbott and
Gregorios-Pippas 2010; Buehler 2013; Butt 2016). For instance, studies
on Egypt show how an increase in religious orthodoxy among the popu-
lation has impacted the religion policies of successive secular regimes
(e.g. Ismail 2006, 58–81).
Specifically, where secular governments are faced with the growing influ-
ence of private mosques or madrassahs, they may expand the religious infra-
structure of the state and reinforce the regulation of religion. However,
government measures such as the state-led construction of mosques or the
enlargement of religious bureaucracies may reinforce the Islamic character-
istics of the state, as cases as different as Malaysia (e.g. Abbott and
Gregorios-Pippas 2010), Algeria, and Morocco (Parmentier 1999) show.
However, state-led Islamization efforts can not only result from an
increase in Islamic orthodoxy in the wider society but also from the pres-
sure created by rather exclusive Islamist movements. This is illustrated by
both Buehler’s (2013) work on Indonesia and Butt’s (2016) analysis of
Pakistan. Testifying to a lack of popular support for an Islamist agenda,
the vote share of Islamist parties has remained low in both countries.
Nevertheless, in both cases, secular rulers have made significant conces-
sions to well-organized, but largely unrepresentative Islamist social move-
ments. For instance, Islamists in Pakistan have extracted many policy
concessions from secular governments because of their strong capability
to organize street protests, which results from their control over dense
networks of Deobandi (or Qawmi) madrassahs (Butt 2016).
Similarly, theoretical research points to the strong ability of religious
groups to “quickly mobilize collective action,” such as protests, owing
to the shared values and regularized meetings of their members, and the
latter’s unconditional readiness to follow their religious leaders (Gill
2008, 51). Evidently, these characteristics hold true regardless of the
broader social representativeness of the respective religious groups.
However, the question arises under which political conditions secular
governments are more—or less—likely to respond to the pressure
created by Islamist movements.
Political Competition
Case studies on countries as different as Morocco and Algeria (Parmentier
1999), Egypt (Ismail 2006, 58–81), and Malaysia (e.g. Liow 2004;
Islamization by Secular Ruling Parties 261
Kubicek 2015, 83–116) suggest that one of these conditions is when Islamist
movements have political representation through strong Islamist opposition
parties. For instance, consecutive secular regimes in Egypt that were chal-
lenged by the Muslim Brotherhood, which participated in elections,
engaged in diverse Islamization efforts (Ismail 2006, 58–81; Hamid 2014,
171–177, 207, 222). Similarly, in Malaysia, the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO) promoted state-led Islamization to counter the elec-
toral challenge of the Islamist Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) (e.g.
Camroux 1996: esp. 856–857; Kubicek 2015, 83–116), leading Liow
(2004) to speak of an “Islamization race” between the UMNO and the PAS.
Secular ruling parties may try to weaken their Islamist contenders by
co-opting rival Islamist actors. In Malaysia, for example, the UMNO
co-opted Anwar Ibrahim and other leaders of the Malaysian Islamic
Youth Movement (ABIM), an Islamist movement formerly close to the
PAS, into the state (e.g. Camroux 1996, 859–860; Kubicek 2015, 99–
102), increasing the Islamization of the bureaucracy (Abbott and
Gregorios-Pippas 2010).
However, state-led Islamization may prompt Islamist opposition parties
to adopt more orthodox stances to distinguish themselves. Thus, the influ-
ential “inclusion-moderation hypothesis,” which states that Islamists grow
more moderate and democratic when they participate in formal political
processes (Schwedler 2011), may not hold in contexts of fierce political
competition (Mecham and Hwang 2014, 10–11).
Generally, the motivations of secular rulers to co-opt—or make conces-
sions to—religious groups can often be traced not only to the former’s
acknowledgement of religion’s social influence (Fox 2015) but also to
their practical interests. In particular, this includes the desire of secular
state leaders to safeguard their “political survival” (Gill 2008, 9, 47–57;
see also Fox 2015, 36, 38, 239–246), which can also be threatened by
secular contenders. Gill (2008, 51, 53–55) argues that in the context of
fierce competition among secular politicians, secular rulers may “cut
deals” (Gill 2008, 54) with religious groups that might otherwise
strengthen their rivals. Fox (2015, 242, 245) likewise hints that battles
between secular politicians may sometimes influence religion policy-
making more than the secular-religious competition.
Accordingly, Buehler’s (2013) analysis of Indonesia traces how secular
rulers in several Indonesian provinces passed most of the country’s Sharia
(Islamic law) legislation, owing to ties they had forged with radical
Islamist movements and power brokers in the context of fierce electoral
competition among secular politicians.
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(Semi-)Authoritarianism
In addition, many case studies show that secular rulers frequently Islamize
when they lack democratic legitimacy (Malik 1986; Parmentier 1999;
Freedman 2009, 113–115, 122–123; Khan 2013; Kubicek 2015, 83–
116) and, thus, attempt to use Islamization as an authoritarian legitimation
strategy. In Pakistan, for instance, military ruler Zia-ul Haq engaged in far-
ranging Islamization efforts to compensate for his lack of electoral legiti-
macy (Malik 1986, 594–605; Khan 2013). Similar tendencies have been
observed in authoritarian Algeria and Morocco (Parmentier 1999,
esp. 36–41), or semi-authoritarian Malaysia (Camroux 1996, 856–863;
Freedman 2009, 106; Liow 2004, 185).
Authoritarian government practices are not incompatible, but, in fact,
often go hand in hand with political competition, as the literature on
“semi-authoritarian” (Ottaway 2003) or “competitive authoritarian”
(Levitsky and Way 2002) regimes shows. Specifically, while “competitive
authoritarian regimes” create a highly uneven playing field, they continue
to face political oppositions that can potentially threaten their survival
(Levitsky and Way 2002). While such regimes rely on repression to safe-
guard their rule, extensive onslaughts on (semi-)democratic institutions,
such as elections, can spark resistance that may also bring them down
(Levitsky and Way 2002, 58–59).
In such a context, secular incumbents in Muslim-majority countries
may malign their political opponents as promoting “wrong” or “extremist”
versions of Islam, as the Malaysian case shows (Noor 2003, cited in
Kubicek 2015, 102). Concurrently, the repression of secular opposition
forces may strengthen Islamist groups in various ways (Camroux 1996,
856; Freedman 2009, 113). Moreover, authoritarian regimes often also
repress or try to divide and rule Islamist groups (Camroux 1996,
esp. 863–865, 868; Freedman 2009), a situation that may strengthen ortho-
dox organizations. In Indonesia, for instance, the Suharto regime forged
alliances with hardline Islamists to counter moderate Islamic groups that
demanded democratization (Freedman 2009, 114–117, 124).
ISLAMIZATION BY SECULAR RULERS IN BANGLADESH:
FROM PAST TO PRESENT
The preamble of Bangladesh’s 1972 constitution, which was passed under
AL leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, enshrined secularism, democracy,
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nationalism, and socialism (d’Costa 2007, 226). In 1977, however, the
military regime of General Ziaur Rahman removed the principles of
socialism and secularism, replacing them with the invocation of faith in
Allah. Zia also abolished the ban on religious politics, leading to the
reconstitution of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) that had sided
with Pakistan during the war and whose militias have been implicated
in large-scale massacres. Furthermore, Zia and his BNP coined the
concept of Bangladeshi nationalism that emphasizes the Muslim character-
istics of the nation and thus differs from the AL’s Bengali nationalism that
builds on the country’s ethno-linguistic identity. In 1988, the military
regime of General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who founded the Jatiya
Party (JP), made Islam the state religion. Both Zia and Ershad relied on
religious rhetoric, promoted the building of mosques and allowed conser-
vative madrassahs and Islamic welfare associations to grow and receive
funding from the Middle East.4 The literature is unanimous that both mil-
itary dictators used Islamization as a legitimation strategy to compensate for
their lack of electoral legitimacy (e.g. Milam 2007; Siddiqi 2011, 12, 19;
Jahan and Shahan 2014, 427, 429). Ahamed and Nazneen (1990,
esp. 807–808) conclude that the “upsurge in Islamic activities” under mil-
itary rule was “not due to Islamic revivalism” but “power politics.”
The parliamentary period from 1991 to 2006 was marked by fierce
political competition between the AL and the BNP, now led by Sheikh
Hasina, the daughter of Sheikh Mujib, and General Zia’s widow,
Khaleda Zia, respectively. When in office, both parties staffed the admin-
istration with their own loyalists, while repressing the opposition. Each
time elections were held, the AL and the BNP alternated in power and
former opposition parties took revenge on their outgoing rivals through
violent attacks (Lorch 2014). When in the opposition, both parties used
large-scale, violent demonstrations to exert political influence.5
The rivalry between the parties was furthered by Bangladesh’s first-
past-the-post system, which led both the AL and the BNP to co-opt
Islamist forces to gain power. In 1991, the BNP relied on the support of
the JI to assume government, while in 1996 the JI joined the AL’s
protest movement to oust the BNP. From 2001 to 2006, the BNP led a coa-
lition government that included the JI and the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), a
federation of small Deobandi parties. Their role as “kingmakers”
enabled the Islamist parties to expand their political influence, although
their combined vote share declined (Karim and Fair 2007, 1, 5; Riaz
2007a, 2014), from 14,41% in 1991, to 9.7% in 1996, and 4.97% in
2001, respectively (Riaz 2014, 163).
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During the BNP-led coalition government, JI representatives headed the
Ministry of Social Welfare, as well as, temporarily, the ministries of agri-
culture and industry, although the party received only 4.29% of the vote in
2001 (Riaz 2014). Owing to the influence of the JI and the IOJ in the
ruling coalition, the government initiated steps to grant official recognition
of the degrees of Qawmi madrassahs (Masud 2006), orthodox education
institutions that mostly adhere to the Deobandi faith and operate largely
outside state control (ICG 2006, 13–14; Riaz 2007b, 37–40). Moreover,
the JI used its time in office to establish its cadres in the administration
and the education system (Riaz 2007b, 27).
As Riaz (2014, esp. 156) convincingly argues, due to their kingmaker
role, the inclusion of Bangladesh’s Islamist parties into the political
system did not lead to their moderation. Before the 2008 elections, for
instance, the JI removed a clause that postulated the “sovereignty of
Allah,” and thus contradicted the democratic principle of popular sover-
eignty from its party constitution to meet the requirements of the
Election Commission (Riaz 2014, 169; Kabir 2015, 72). A JI leader
explained, however, that this change had been “absolutely strategic” and
did not alter the party’s belief in divine rather than popular sovereignty.6
Similarly, a senior JI adviser claimed that he had convinced the JI’s
leaders to drop the clause, telling them that “God’s sovereignty does not
depend on people’s recognition—so just forget about it.”7
Furthermore, the period from 2001 to 2006 was marked by a rise in ter-
rorist activities, including over 400 countrywide bombings. Many experts
hold that the lines between militant groups and above-ground Islamist
parties were blurred, as several members of terrorist organizations were
former cadres of the JI (e.g. ICG 2006, 18f.; Riaz 2007a, 25–26; Ahsan
and Banavar 2011, 73–74).
Moreover, since the early 1990s, both the AL and the BNP have
repeatedly relied on religious symbolism and downplayed the country’s
secular traditions (Jahan and Shahan 2014). Specifically, between 1991
and 2006, the BNP’s electoral campaigns stressed the party’s Islamic
credentials, while portraying the AL as “anti-Islamic.” While the AL
branded both the BNP and the JI as “anti-liberation force(s),” it refrained
from running on an explicitly secular agenda in its 1996, 2001, and 2006
campaigns (Jahan and Shahan 2014, 430–432, 433–435). Moreover, it
sought to prove that it was not “anti-Islamic.”8 In 2006, the AL forged
an agreement with the orthodox Deobandi party Khilafat Majlis, prom-
ising that if it came to power it would not pass any law that went
against the Koran.9
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According to Jahan and Shahan (2014, 432), the proneness of the AL
and the BNP to use religious rhetoric was mainly due to the fact that
from 1991 to 2001, elections were always won by the party aligned
with the JI. Based on field interviews, they show, however, that the deci-
sion of voters to vote for either the AL or the BNP was often driven by the
voters’ evaluation of government performance in secular matters, such as
consumer prices, and, hence, by a strong anti-incumbency factor, rather
than religious preferences (Jahan and Shahan 2014, 435–436).
Consequently, they conclude that the AL’s and the BNP’s religious cam-
paign tactics rested on a “false premise” (Jahan and Shahan 2014, 428)
and usually failed to increase the vote share of either party.
In its 2008 election campaign, the AL returned to a secular agenda
(Jahan and Shahan 2014, 432), promising to fight militancy and try the
Islamist war criminals, a change that can likely be traced to the widespread
popular frustration about the BNP’s failure to contain terrorism during its
rule (see also Jahan and Shahan 2014, 435). The BNP and its “nationalist-
Islamist” coalition, which included the JI and the IOJ, campaigned on the
slogan to “save Islam and the country” (Daily Star 23 December 2008).
The AL won the elections decisively, while the BNP suffered a heavy
defeat. The combined vote share of all Islamist parties amounted to
6.27% and, thus, remained low but constant (Riaz 2014, 165).
As Riaz details, this percentage is consistent with both the 2008 pre-
election poll of Nielsen and the Daily Star and the 2005 World Value
Survey that recorded popular support for an Islamic state at only 7%
and 9%, respectively (Riaz 2014). However, most Bangladeshis are per-
sonally religious. In a 2016 survey conducted by Nielsen-Bangladesh,
74% of the respondents said that religion was “very influential” (39%)
or “somewhat influential” (35%) on their “day-to-day views and opinions”
(BSoPO 2016, 33). As of 2013, electoral support for the JI had further
dropped according to a 2013 Nielsen/Democracy International survey,
the latest available opinion poll on this matter (New Age 19 September
2013).
Nevertheless, widespread personal religiosity provides a social context
in which issues of “Islamic sensibility” (Kabir 2015, 69) and religious
“taboos,” such as criticism of the Prophet,10 can be mobilized against
incumbent governments (Kabir 2015, 69–71).11 This explains the AL’s
above-mentioned fear of being seen as “anti-Islamic.” Given the low
level of popular support for the Islamist parties, however, the AL’s and
the BNP’s kowtows to Islamist forces are excessive, leading a local uni-
versity expert to conclude,
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It’s the kind of secular politics […] we have that provides space for these
[Islamist] forces. […] They [the main political leaders] are starting their
election campaigns by going to shrines or going to Saudi Arabia. […] If
you want to do politics here, you don’t mess with faith. […]. [But]
secular politicians have over-used the religion card. […]. The political
parties […] will continue to make compromises, but […] society is
secular. 12
Since 2009, the AL government has severely repressed the BNP and the JI
(e.g. ICG 2012). In June 2011, it abolished the “caretaker system” that guar-
anteed the conduct of national elections under a non-partisan interim gov-
ernment. After staging violent demonstrations in which over 300 people
were killed, the BNP boycotted the 2014 polls. The JI was unable to run
because in 2013 the High Court had cancelled its registration, arguing
that the party’s charter went against Bangladesh’s secular constitution
(Lorch 2014). For the first time since 1991, a party has hence extended
its winner-take-all-politics to a second term, leading to an unprecedented
concentration of power in the hands of the AL.13 The 2018/2019 elections
will likely decide whether Bangladesh’s political system retains veritable
democratic characteristics or becomes predominantly authoritarian. The
BNP has threatened to boycott the polls again unless the caretaker system
is reinstated. In this case, however, it would lose its registration, leaving
the country without any veritable opposition party.14 A leading BNP func-
tionary stated that if the 2018/2019 polls were unfree, the BNP-led coalition
would unleash large-scale violence and “paralyze the whole country.”15
Concurrently, however, many AL leaders feel that they cannot leave
power anymore because in the case of a government change, they would
face unprecedented reprisals by the BNP and its allies.16
Islamization under the AL: Concessions to an Islamist Social
Movement
At the beginning of its tenure, the AL pushed secularization. In 2011, it
passed a National Women Development Policy that was fiercely
opposed by Islamist actors and reinstated secularism into the constitution
(Islam 2016, 65–66). Both of these moves were protested by the hitherto
unknown Hefazat-e-Islam, an orthodox Deobandi movement rooted in the
country’s Qawmi madrassahs (Kabir 2015, 69).17
The Deobandi ideology is an orthodox scholastic tradition within reviv-
alist Sunni Islam. It derives from the Darul Uloom Deoband School in
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India and focuses on spreading religious education through madrassahs
(Hashmi 2016, 142). Generally, the Deobandi faith emphasizes (blind)
imitation (taqlid) (Kabir 2015, 57) and thus differs from the JI, the
other major revivalist movement in Bangladesh that allows some
measure of individual reasoning (ijtihad). The JI is sometimes compared
with the Muslim Brotherhood and draws on Maududi who emphasized
control of the state as the main means to change society (Kabir 2015,
51, 68–73).18 The Deobandis and the JI concur, however, in their rejection
of the mystic and syncretistic traditions associated with Sufi Islam (Kabir
2015, 52; Hashmi 2016, 142).
A senior leader of Hefazat described the movement as a network of
several Deobandi groups whose agenda is to protest any “anti-Islamic”
activities, including both government and social activities. While
Hefazat sought to bring society and politics in line with the Sharia, he
explained, its aim was not to gain power or to topple (or support) any gov-
ernment. At some point, however, Hefazat’s main leader, Shah Ahmad
Shafi, had decided to establish relations with all (Deobandi) Islamic
forces, including various Islamist parties, to build a platform of like-
minded people across Bangladesh.19
While the AL did not make any concessions to Hefazat in 2011, this
changed from 2013 onwards. In March 2010, the AL government had
established the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) to try the war
crimes committed by Islamist militias in 1971. Starting from early 2013,
the tribunal announced verdicts, most of which targeted leading JI repre-
sentatives. In February 2013, the ICT’s issuing of a life sentence against
the JI’s Assistant Secretary General Abdul Quader Mollah sparked
massive protests by the Shahbag movement, a social movement led by
secular activists and bloggers, who demanded the hanging of Mollah, a
revival of the spirit of the liberation war and a total ban of the JI (Kabir
2015, 68–69).20
The Shahbag movement triggered large-scale counter-demonstrations
by Hefazat (Kabir 2015, 68–69),21 which branded the Shahbag activists
as “anti-Islamic” and “atheist.” Moreover, it now began to raise 13
demands, including the passage of a blasphemy law, the scrapping of the
women development policy and making Islamic education mandatory
(Kabir 2015, 70).22 In early May 2013, the Hefazat’s demonstrations
blocked entire parts of Dhaka (Islam 2016, 64, 83, 227).
The mobilizing capacity of Hefazat was huge and the movement report-
edly brought around 500,000 followers to Dhaka (Bouissou 2013), posing
a serious challenge to the government’s stability.23 According to a UN
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representative, leading AL members were “terrified” by the magnitude of
the protests.24 Notably, however, the vast majority of the protesters were
faculty members and students of Qawmi madrassahs controlled by
Hefazat leaders, many of whom were bussed to Dhaka from Hefazat’s
stronghold in Chittagong (BBC 6 May 2017), rather than common people
joining the movement to support its demands.25 As an expert who works
with these madrassahs explained, Qawmi madrassah students are highly
dependent on their religious teachers/leaders (mullahs) and would
follow them whatever they say. Thus, if the mullahs told them to come
to the streets, they would stand “like an army.” One average Qawmi
madrassah, he estimated, could bring about 2000 followers into the
streets, while the mullahs, who led these madrassahs, had dense personal
networks among themselves.26 Thus, Hefazat has a “ready network,”
enabling the movement to quickly mobilize its members for demonstra-
tions, which makes it an important player in Bangladesh’s street and
power politics.27 Concurrently, however, many local experts are convinced
that the movement does not represent vast sections of the population.28
This contradicts foreign diplomats and aid experts who view the rise of
Hefazat as a sign of an increase in orthodox tendencies in the wider
society, or even as an expression of popular support for Islamic
fundamentalism.29
In particular, the AL government was afraid of the emergence of a united
mobilizational front of the opposition. Hefazat and the JI cooperated during
the 2013 protests (Kabir 2015, 51, 68–73),30 and, in May 2013, the BNP
sought to exploit the demonstrations to topple the AL, calling on ordinary
people to join Hefazat (Islam 2016, 64, 83, 227). Significantly, Hefazat, the
JI, and the BNP all portrayed the Shahbag movement as being supported by
the AL government, while, concurrently, attempting to mobilize religious
sensitivity by depicting the Shahbag activists as “atheist” (Kabir 2015,
69–70).31 A Shahbag leader who was simultaneously a main leader of
the AL’s student wing, the Chattra League (CL), recalled that the BNP’s
chairwoman Khaleda Zia had stated publicly that “these people [the
Shahbag activists] are atheist.” Thereby, he lamented, the BNP was
“very planfully [sic!]” playing “the religion card” and trying to make the
religious people view the Shahbag activists as infidels [kafir].32
According to a terrorism expert close to the AL, this fueled the AL’s
fear of being viewed as “anti-Islamic” that is grounded in the party’s expe-
rience of losing the 1991 and 2001 elections.33 In particular, the party was
afraid of being seen as anti-Muslim if it cracked down on the protests of the
religious men,34 given that, as a local expert explained, while most
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Bangladeshis do not want conservative religious leaders to get involved in
politics, “they respect them in their mosques.”35
In this situation, the AL tried to negotiate with Hefazat (Islam 2016,
64), and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) reportedly
intervened to protect Shafi, fearing that if he was killed in clashes,
Hefazat’s supporters might run amok. As Hefazat’s leaders refused to
give in, however, the government finally dispersed the demonstrations
with the minimal force possible.36 Subsequently, the AL government
adopted a mixed strategy, consisting of both pressure and appeasement.
It infiltrated Hefazat with security forces and put its followers under sur-
veillance by the intelligence agencies.37 Similarly, the movement has
faced serious repression and harassment.38 Concurrently, however, the
AL also established communication channels to Hefazat and has dia-
logued with its leaders over their demands.39 In early 2017, one of
Hefazat’s senior leaders emphasized that they “negotiate[d]” and “com-
promise[d]” with the government to be able to survive, not because they
wanted to. As part of the current compromise between the two sides, he
added, the government allowed Hefazat to keep operating, while the
movement refrained from staging any major demonstrations.40
According to local experts, the previously mentioned textbook changes
constitute explicit concessions made by the AL government to Hefazat.41
Correspondingly, government authorities imposed the aforementioned
restrictions against the editor of Islam Bitorko at the Ekushey Book
Fair, following threats by the Islamist party Khilafat Andolan, whose
membership overlaps with that of Hefazat,42 to storm the event (Daily
Star Lebanon 16 February 2016). Similarly, in May 2017, “Lady
Justice,” the statue of a woman wearing a sari, sword, and scale was
removed from the premises of the Supreme Court, following protests by
Hefazat (Kugelman and Ahmad 2017).
The AL has sought to combine its concessions to Hefazat with efforts to
increase state control over the Qawmi madrassahs.43 In April 2017, the
Ministry of Education ordered that the Dawra-e-Hadith certificate of
Qawmi madrassahs be recognized as an equivalent to a master’s in
Arabic and Islamic studies, completing a process initiated by the BNP
during its last tenure. The formulation of the madrassah’s curricula and
the award of Dawra-e-Hadith certificates are to be centralized under a
committee headed by Hefazat’s leader Ahmad Shafi, which, however,
reports to the Ministry of Education. While the measure establishes
some minimum government control over the Qawmi madrassahs, it will
Islamize the bureaucracy, as it will allow many Qawmi madrassah
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graduates to apply for positions in the civil service (Bdnews24 13 April
2017). Simultaneously, the government is extending its own religious
bureaucracy. As of early 2017, it reportedly planned to spend around
70,000 million taka on constructing a huge mosque with an adjunct
Islamic studies center in Dhaka, along with similar, smaller mosques
and study centers at all tiers of the local government system around the
country, to centralize religious oversight.44
Islamization under the AL: Political Competition and the
Co-optation of Islamist Forces
With the 2018/2019 elections drawing closer, the AL has enhanced its
efforts to co-opt Hefazat. While the latter is not a political party in
itself, it involves many Islamist leaders who simultaneously lead small
Deobandi parties, such as Khilafat Andolan, Khilafat Majlis, or parties
assembled in the IOJ.45 A senior BNP leader explained that before
2013, Hefazat had been aligned with the BNP’s electoral alliance
through the IOJ, which had formed part of the BNP-led coalition govern-
ment.46 Accordingly, the BNP supported Hefazat’s 2013 protests, and
Hefazat and the BNP also coordinated their anti-government demonstra-
tions surrounding the 2014 elections. Recently, however, the AL has
put enormous pressure on Hefazat and the Deobandi parties within it to
make them align with its own electoral front.47 In early 2017, a leader
of both Hefazat and Khilafat Andolan elaborated that the government
had just revived 43 criminal cases filed against Hefazat followers during
the 2013 demonstrations and was also threating to take two big madras-
sahs, including the Lalbagh Madrassah in Dhaka, away from the control
of Hefazat leaders, if the movement refused to leave the BNP.48
In March 2017, both a senior Hefazat and a senior BNP leader stated
that, owing to a combination of pressure and bribes, the AL had
managed to break the IOJ out of the BNP’s and make it join its own elec-
toral alliance.49 In July 2017, 10 Islamist parties, including the IOJ and a
faction of Khilafat Andolan, publicly announced their readiness to join the
AL’s electoral coalition (Chowdhury 2017). Moreover, as of early 2017,
the DGFI and other intelligence services were reportedly negotiating
with both the Deobandi parties in Hefazat and other Islamist parties,
except the JI, to convince them to form a united electoral platform to
weaken the BNP.50 As part of these “negotiations,” the government report-
edly gave between 250 and 500 million taka to various small Islamist
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parties.51 In early 2017, some party leaders and local experts speculated
that a united Islamist platform for the 2018/2019 elections might coalesce
around the JP of former military dictator Ershad, who has acted as Sheikh
Hasina’s envoy since 2014.52 In July 2017, Ershad announced the forma-
tion of the United National Alliance (UNA) between the JP and 57 min-
iscule Islamist parties. With its postulation of excluding all “anti-liberation
quarters,” the alliance distanced itself from the JI. Concurrently, it explic-
itly committed itself to “Bangladeshi nationalism,” thereby seeking to co-
opt the political ideology of the BNP (Bdnews24 5 July 2017). In the
long-run, the JP might constitute an attractive coalition partner for the
Deobandi parties in Hefazat who reject female leadership and are thus
uncomfortable with supporting either the AL or the BNP.53
Previous election results, as well as interviews with local experts and
political leaders suggest that the capacity of Hefazat and the Deobandi
parties to mobilize votes is limited (see also Kabir 2015, 65) and that
orthodox voters who sympathize with Hefazat will remain reluctant to
vote for the AL.54 However, instead of capturing many votes from
Hefazat supporters, one of the AL’s main motives for co-opting the
Deobandi parties is to prevent joint, violent street mobilization by the
BNP, the JI, and Hefazat in the run-up to the 2018/2019 elections. As a
high-ranking AL leader explained,
Hefazat [followers] will never vote for us. They will never support secular
politics. But one thing is to handle them to be much less violent. […]
Indirectly, some people are sitting with them and dialogue with them not
to be more violent.55
If the JI, the BNP and Hefazat all became more violent, he continued, the
situation would become very difficult for the AL to handle. Similarly,
press reports indicate that the AL has bribed several Hefazat leaders,
including Shafi, to appease them before campaigning starts (Miazee
2017).
Moreover, by co-opting the Deobandi parties, the AL also tries to show
to the electorate that it is not “anti-Islamic,” while, concurrently, attempt-
ing to weaken the JI and divide the BNP’s vote bank (Khaled 2017).56 As
the above-cited AL leader stated
They [Hefazat] are […] an Islamic fundamentalist group. No doubt about it.
And they […] want to see Bangladesh as an Islamic state. […] [But] you
have to consider election politics. […] The fractions and divisions
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[among the Islamist parties] we need [them]. This is why we can easily
handle the elections.57
Thereby, aligning with the Deobandi parties contradicts the AL’s political
narrative of being the guardian of the independence struggle at least some-
what less than if the party forged an electoral alliance with the JI,
because, other than the JI, the Deobandis did not oppose Bangladesh’s inde-
pendence through massacres (Khalidi 2013). However, a high-ranking BNP
leader opined that the AL’s repression of the JI was primarily due to electoral
calculations and if the JI left the BNP, the government’s repression of the JI
would end immediately,58 an assessment that is backed by several experts.59
Last but not least, if the 2018/2019 elections were to be free and fiercely
contested, the 1% or 2% of the votes that might be captured by the Deobandi
parties could already make a difference. Currently, however, there are strong
indications that the elections will not be free and fair and that the AL might
just “literally distribute seats,” awarding between 25 and 35 parliamentary
seats to Islamist parties other than the JI to weaken the BNP.60
The AL’s strategy has enhanced, rather than weakened, the BNP’s reli-
ance on the JI with its highly disciplined cadres,61 and leading BNP rep-
resentatives have publicly committed themselves to maintaining their
relations to various Islamist parties (Khaled 2017). As one of them
stated frankly, in terms of their co-optation strategies, the “AL and the
BNP are the same” and the BNP would also co-opt Hefazat again, if it
had a chance. Both the AL and the BNP, he admitted, were acting on
the logic that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” thereby playing
“a dirty game” that “is not good for the country.”62
Islamization under the AL: Increasing Authoritarianism,
Islamist Radicalization and the Weakening of Secular
Opposition to Islamism
Increasing state repression and the conduct of the 2014 elections without
any participation of the opposition have brought Bangladesh closer to
authoritarian rule. Concurrently, the lack of a proper electoral mandate
has created “paranoia” among the AL’s leaders.63 Some observers opine
that in this context, the AL has begun to use Islamization as a legitimation
strategy.64 However, the AL’s legitimation efforts have often been defen-
sive in that the party has mainly struggled to prove that it is not “anti-
Islamic.” Nevertheless, the AL has made concessions to Islamist forces
that have weakened secular opposition to Islamism.
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Since 2013, over 30 atheist and secular bloggers and intellectuals have
been killed by extremist groups, with both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
claiming responsibility. While the government has employed security mea-
sures to combat terrorism, leading AL representatives have also rebuked
secular activists for maligning the Prophet, creating a climate of fear
(Graham-Harrison and Hammadi 2016; see also Fazli 2016). Moreover,
a prominent human-rights lawyer suggested that the AL exploited the
presence of Hefazat, which has publicly threatened human-rights activists,
to discourage anti-government criticism by secular actors. The govern-
ment, she argued, had been very “vicious” against the political opposition,
while concurrently being “soft” on Hefazat and portraying itself as the
savior of secularism. The AL’s strategy, she opined, was to allow
Hefazat to keep operating within limits to make secular activists say
“oh, thank you, government for keeping them at bay.”65
Furthermore, the AL’s handling of the 2013 demonstrations divided the
Shahbag movement, which started as a spontaneous gathering of secular
bloggers, leftist activists and common citizens. Accusing the government
of delaying the war crime trials and conspiring with the JI to save Quader
Mollah, the movement was directly critical of the AL in the beginning.66
Soon, however, the AL tried to co-opt it.67 A major leftist Shahbag leader
claimed that bloggers and non-party activists were soon marginalized by
the CL and the United Cultural Forum, the AL’s student and cultural
wings, who “were trained […] organized and funded for this event.”
Calling another major Shahbag leader who belonged to the CL a
“stooge,” he opined that the government had destroyed the non-partisan
character of the movement and “betrayed” the Shahbag activists. As the
AL co-opted the movement, he lamented, “[o]ur passions and our emo-
tions were used.”68 However, while the CL indeed tried to monopolize
the Shahbag movement,69 some of its leaders criticized the AL govern-
ment as well. For instance, the same CL leader who was so bitterly
accused by his leftist counterpart emphasized that the Shahbag movement
had not only criticized the government’s handling of the ICT but also
demanded political reforms, such as anti-corruption measures. Citing an
episode when both Hefazat activists and state security forces prevented
Shahbag activists from protesting in Chittagong, he lamented that the gov-
ernment had “patronized” Hefazat to break the Shahbag movement, which
challenged its rule.70 Ultimately, the CL also split into a fraction that was
close to, and one that was more independent of the government.71
Moreover, to repress the political opposition, the AL is maligning the
BNP as promoting a misguided version of Islam. Leading AL
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representatives have, at least implicitly, accused both the JI and the BNP as
being responsible for terrorist activities, including the 2016 Holey Artisan
attack (Fazli 2016). A high-ranking AL leader stated that the “BNP
[doesn’t] believe in secular, democratic politics” and “is encouraging all
those people who want to destroy the secular democratic philosophy.”
Since 2001, he claimed, terrorist activities were committed “sometimes
in the name of JI and a major part of BNP also.”72 Similarly, an AL func-
tionary at Dhaka University described the JI as “most fundamentalist” and
called both the JI and the BNP “the father of the militant groups,” stating
that
The emergence of all these [terrorist] groups took place during their [the
BNP’s and the JI’s] rule. [They] used to patronize all this process against
the democratic forces. All these extremist groups received patronization
from these political parties.
“For becoming a member of the civilized, humanized society,” he went
on, the AL needed to “crush” all “fundamentalist groups,” threating that
if the BNP supported any of them it would “also be in trouble.” As he con-
cluded, “liberal, democratic society must accommodate others. […] But
not groups that cause threats to humanity,” such as the JI.73
Moreover, the AL government has instrumentalized the ICT to perse-
cute critics.74 By mid-2015, most of the JI’s leaders had been hanged,
following highly politicized trials. In addition, the JI has faced massive
harassment, including torture and forced disappearances, by the state
security forces. The repression of the JI could foster radicalization because
if the party is driven underground, some of its sympathizers might turn
toward more militant groups. Moreover, while the JI pursues the strategy
to change society through political means, government repression appears
to have reinforced its ideological orthodoxy.75 In early 2017, both a leader
and a senior adviser of the JI stated that while the Sharia should only be
introduced with the “people’s consent” and the introduction of Islamic
corporal punishments should only be one step after many others, both nev-
ertheless remained important goals of the party.76 As the adviser stated, “if
the conditions are there […] for adultery, 100 leashes should be good, […]
a few hand-cuttings would change the society.”77
The JI leader explained that for the 2018/2019 elections, the party was
considering all options, including the formation of a new party under a dif-
ferent name or having some JI members run as independent candidates.78
In addition, members of the JI have reportedly begun to infiltrate various
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different parties, including both the AL and the BNP, at the local level,
potentially strengthening Islamist tendencies within these parties.79
Furthermore, the AL’s divide-and-rule tactics might strengthen parties
that are ideologically still more radical than the JI. The Deobandi IOJ,
which now forms part of the AL’s electoral alliance, is a case in point.
Under the BNP-led coalition government, the IOJ’s chairman Fazlul
Haque Amini publicly expressed his sympathy for Osama bin Laden
(BBC 27 November 2001), and vowed to make Bangladesh the next
Afghanistan.80 This distinguishes the IOJ from the JI, whose representa-
tives refer to Rachid Ghannouchi and the Tunisian Ennahda, or the
Turkish Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), as role models.81
CONCLUSION
From past to present, the Islamization of public policy in Bangladesh has
mostly constituted a top-down process driven by secular ruling parties.
Thereby, three main conditions have prompted secular rulers to engage
in Islamization: first, the rise of Islamist social movements; second,
fierce political competition; and third, (semi-)authoritarian rule. While
the Bangladeshi case thus provides support for existing case studies that
have pointed to the relevance of these three factors in spurring
Islamization by secular rulers, it also furnishes empirical evidence that
serves both to clarify the relative explanatory potential of each of these
factors and to connect them to each other.
Specifically, it suggests that the presence of Islamist movements alone is
not enough to prompt secular rulers to Islamize but does so only when these
movements threaten the political survival of secular state leaders in a context
marked by political competition and/or semi-authoritarianism. This is exem-
plified by the AL government’s strategy toward Hefazat, which first arose as
a counter movement to the party’s push for secularization during its early
tenure. The AL did not make any concessions to Hefazat following its emer-
gence in 2010 but only from 2013 onwards when the movement’s street
protests escalated and the AL’s main rival, the BNP, sought to exploit its
mobilizational potential to topple the government. The AL’s concessions
to Hefazat have increased as the party’s ruling style has turned more autho-
ritarian after the 2014 elections, which did not provide it with proper elec-
toral legitimacy. Concurrently, a historical overview of the Islamization
efforts of the military regimes of Zia and Ershad suggests that non-demo-
cratic secular rulers may engage in Islamization even when strong
276 Lorch
Islamist movements are absent, indicating that (semi-)authoritarian rule
potentially constitutes the strongest driver of Islamization by secular rulers.
In addition, the empirical findings of this article also present three expla-
nations to disentangle the apparent contradiction between the low level of
electoral support for Islamist parties and the readiness of consecutive
secular governments in Bangladesh to accommodate Islamist forces.
Firstly, as the literature already indicates (e.g. Karim and Fair 2007; Riaz
2007a, 2014), both the AL and the BNP have sought to co-opt Islamist
parties to win elections under the country’s first-past-the-post system.
Secondly, the Bangladeshi case also shows, however, that fierce political
competition can not only manifest itself in the electoral arena but also
through violent street politics. In such a context, secular ruling parties
may co-opt Islamist movements that might otherwise increase the street
power of their political rivals, even if these movements are largely unrepre-
sentative and unable to mobilize many votes. Thirdly, while Bangladesh’s
secular traditions remain strong, most Bangladeshis are personally religious,
and breaking religious taboos can spark resistance. Hence, the BNP and its
allies have repeatedly portrayed the AL as “anti-Islamic,” which, in turn, has
resorted to Islamization as a defensive legitimation strategy, seeking to prove
that this is not the case. This tendency has expanded as the AL’s rule has
become increasingly authoritarian. With regard to the broader theoretical
debate on the extent to which religious ideas, the competition between
secular and religious social actors, or the interests of political elites drive
religion policy-making (Gill 2008; Fox 2015), these findings show that
under conditions of political competition and/or (semi-)authoritarianism,
the interest of secular rulers in safeguarding their political survival can
serve to multiply the political impact of Islamic religious actors.
Accordingly, the findings of this article also refute alternative explana-
tions that have been raised by foreign diplomats and aid experts and that
portray Bangladesh’s current Islamization process as the result of an
increase in religious orthodoxy in society, a change in the AL’s ideology
from secularism to Islamism, or both.82 This assessment is also backed by
the fact that the change in the AL’s religion policy, from strengthening
secularism to promoting Islamization, has occurred within <5 years,
whereas religious and ideological convictions are unlikely to change
quickly (Gill 2008, 31). However, the AL’s Islamization measures may
strengthen orthodox Islamic forces in the long-term, particularly if these
measures interact with authoritarian government practices that weaken
secular opposition to Islamism and strengthen radical Islamist forces
through divide-and-rule tactics.
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The findings of this article also have practical implications for foreign
and development policy toward Bangladesh. Many foreign diplomats
and donors in the country have begun to take social Islamization for
granted and now focus on de-radicalization programs and measures to
strengthen “moderate Islamic forces.”83 However, unless combined with
an in-depth analysis of the real drivers of Islamization, such efforts may
weaken the country’s secular traditions.
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